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CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AND LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS: UNITED STATES V. LAPOINTE, 690 F.3D 
434 (6TH CIR. 2012) 
Nicholas F. Caprino∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Enforcement of criminal conspiracy laws is only effective if 
supported by a proficient understanding of the laws’ underlying policies 
and purposes in the Unites States’ crime prevention framework.  
Criminal conspiracy convictions should not be imposed to punish or 
prevent the substantive crimes they facilitate.1  Rather, they are meant to 
deter the collaborative acts and preparation that make the commission of 
a crime more efficient, effective, and likely to succeed.2  It is the 
agreement between multiple actors to support various objectives 
necessary to complete a crime that enhances the danger to society 
beyond a lone actor preparing for criminal activity.3  Only once 
attorneys and judges understand the policy behind conspiracy can they 
correctly apply it to lesser included offense jury instructions. 
In United States v. LaPointe, the defendant, James LaPointe, was 
accused of involvement with an oxycodone distribution ring.4  At the 
end of the trial, he requested an instruction that would allow the jury to 
convict on the lesser included offense of conspiracy to possess 
oxycodone (without intent to distribute).5  The jury would only be able 
to convict on conspiracy to possess (the lesser included conspiracy) if it 
found that he satisfied the elements of conspiracy to possess, but not the 
elements of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute (the greater 
conspiracy).6  The district court denied the request, and the jury 
convicted LaPointe of conspiring to possess with the intent to 
distribute.7  The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the lower court 
 
 ∗ Associate Member, 2012–2013 University of Cincinnati Law Review.  I would like to thank 
my wife, Laura Caprino, for all the support she has given me throughout law school. 
 1. See United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915). 
 2. See id. at 88; Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1309–10 (2003); 
see generally Jens David Ohlin, Group Think: The Law of Conspiracy and Collective Reason, 98 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 169–70 (2007) (providing a comprehensive overview of criminal 
conspiracy law). 
 3. See Ohlin, supra note 2, at 169–70. 
 4. United States v. LaPointe, 690 F.3d 434, 438 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 5. Id. at 438–39. 
 6. Id. at 439. 
 7. Id. at 438–39.  LaPointe was also convicted of attempting to possess, which he challenged 
separately on the basis that he failed to take a “substantial step” towards possession.  Id. at 443–44.  The 
Appeals court affirmed the district court’s conviction on this count.  Id. at 444. 
1
Caprino: Criminal Conspiracy and Lesser Included Offense Jury Instructions
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014
258 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82 
should have granted the defendant’s request for a jury instruction 
because conspiracy to possess is a lesser included offense of conspiracy 
to possess with intent to distribute.8  In doing so, the Sixth Circuit 
explicitly pointed out the split between the First and Tenth Circuits and 
adopted the First Circuit’s approach.9 
Part II of this note will outline the standards and elements of criminal 
conspiracy as applied to LaPointe and will also introduce the 
requirements for a lesser included offense instruction.  Part III will 
outline the opinion of LaPointe, and Part IV will discuss the Circuits’ 
analyses of conspiracies with multiple objectives, the intent required to 
convict on conspiracy, as well as the issue of avoiding injustice in lesser 
included conspiracy scenarios.  Finally, Part V will conclude, finding 
that while the Sixth Circuit may have reached the appropriate 
disposition, the court mischaracterized the nature of the circuit split and 
failed to solidify a clear and definitive break from the Tenth Circuit’s 
incorrect analysis of the issue. 
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND RELATED CASES 
A. Conspiracy in Federal Drug Cases 
21 U.S.C. § 846 governs conspiracy in federal drug trafficking cases 
and simply states: “Any person who attempts or conspires to commit 
any offense defined in this title shall be subject to the same penalties as 
those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object 
of the attempt or conspiracy.”  What constitutes conspiracy under § 846 
is left to federal courts’ common law interpretation.10  Generally, the 
elements of conspiracy include 1) an agreement between two or more 
people, 2) the accused’s knowledge of the conspiracy and intent to join, 
and 3) the accused’s voluntary participation in the conspiracy.11  While 
some laws require an overt act to prove the agreement element, courts 
have held that § 846 does not require such proof; instead, the 
government need only prove the agreement itself.12  The prosecution 
 
 8. Id. at 443. 
 9. Id. at 441–42. 
 10. See, e.g., United States v. Bland, 653 F.2d 989, 996 (5th Cir. 1981); United Stated v. Turner, 
319 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 11. Turner, 319 F.3d at 721. 
 12. United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 15 (1994).  For example, 18 U.S.C. § 371 explicitly 
requires an overt act to demonstrate agreement to join a conspiracy, while 21 U.S.C. § 846 requires no 
such proof.  United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915) (holding an overt act is required under 
§ 37 of the Criminal Code); Statute of Limitations in Prosecution for Conspiracy to Commit Offense 
Against or to Defraud United States 18 U.S.C.A. § 371, 68 A.L.R. FED. 628, § 3 (2011) [hereinafter 
Statute of Limitations] (stating that the statute addressed in Rabinowich (§ 37) is a predecessor to 18 
2
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does not need to demonstrate a formal agreement.  For example, “a tacit 
or mutual understanding to engage in a common plan is sufficient” to 
prove an agreement,13 as opposed to an overt act symbolizing the 
agreement.  
Intent to conspire is necessary to convict on conspiracy, but this does 
not mean that proof of specific intent to distribute drugs is required.14  If 
a defendant agrees to a conspiracy with knowledge of the distribution 
and intent to be part of the conspiracy to distribute, that defendant may 
be guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute even if the 
defendant did not intend to actually distribute or possess.15  The 
defendant does not have to actively distribute or intend to actually 
distribute.16  Rather, he must simply intend to join and further a 
conspiracy that has an objective of distribution.17  Although knowledge 
of the conspiracy’s primary objective is required to show intent, 
knowledge alone does not necessarily equate to intent to join the 
conspiracy.18  For example, “mere knowledge” by a defendant that other 
actors intend to actively distribute drugs is not enough to demonstrate 
intent to join a conspiracy to distribute drugs.19 
Further, a single conspiracy may have multiple objectives.20  The 
U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Ingram, solidified this concept 
in U.S. conspiracy law.21  There is a difference between a conspiracy 
with multiple objectives and separate conspiracies with different 
objectives.22  If the conspiracy sets out to complete a primary objective, 
and more minor objectives are completed for the furtherance of the 
primary objective, this constitutes a conspiracy with multiple 
objectives.23  For instance, possessing a drug is a necessary minor 
objective to achieve the greater objective of distributing that drug.  This 
scheme illustrates a single conspiracy with the objectives of possession 
 
U.S.C. § 371). 
 13. United States v. Collins, 78 F.3d 1021, 1037 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Ellzey, 
874 F.2d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 1989)). 
 14. See Bland, 653 F.2d at 996; United States v. Diaz, 655 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 15. See Bland, 653 F.2d at 996; Diaz, 655 F.2d at 584. 
 16. See Bland, 653 F.2d at 996; Diaz, 655 F.2d at 584. 
 17. See Bland, 653 F.2d at 996; Diaz, 655 F.2d at 584. 
 18. Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678 (1959) (citing Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 
319 U.S. 703, 711–12 (1943)) (finding that a conspiracy to primarily conceal a crime may have a minor 
objective to evade federal taxes); Diaz, 655 F.2d at 584. 
 19. United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 20. Ingram, 360 U.S. at 679–80 (citing United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915)). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See United States v. LaPointe, 690 F.3d 434, 441 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Ingram, 360 U.S. at 
679). 
 23. Ingram, 360 U.S. at 679–80 (citing Rabinowich, 238 U.S. at 86); LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441. 
3
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and distribution.24  On the other hand, if a defendant’s possession of 
drugs is wholly unrelated to any distribution, then the conspiracy to 
possess the drugs would be wholly separate from the conspiracy to 
distribute.25  
Finally, actual possession or distribution does not automatically lead 
to guilt on conspiracy to possess or distribute.26  It is not enough to 
commit the substantive offense.  If a defendant is charged with 
conspiracy to possess, simple possession alone will not amount to 
conspiracy.27  The defendant must agree to join, have knowledge of the 
conspiracy’s objective, and intend to conspire.  Only when those 
elements are met is the policy behind conspiracy law achieved.28  
Punishing the substantive crime does not go far enough to separately 
punish the agreements that potentially make the crime more efficient, 
more successful, and more dangerous to society.29  In Rabinowich, the 
Supreme Court demonstrated why punishment of the agreement, wholly 
separate from the substantive offense, is necessary.30  The Supreme 
Court characterized an agreement to do a criminal act as “an offense of 
the gravest character” because of the enhanced injury to the public.31  
The coordinated action between co-conspirators makes conspiracy more 
difficult for the state to detect and prevent than crimes by sole actors.32  
In addition, conspiracies go further in “educating and preparing the 
conspirators for further habitual criminal practices.”33  The Supreme 
Court understood the importance of the distinction between the 
substantive crime and the conspiracy to commit that crime in 
Rabinowich, and that distinction continues to be an integral part of 
courts’ conspiracy analysis today.34 
 
 24. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441. 
 25. See id. (quoting United States v. Garcia, 27 F.3d 1009, 1015 (5th Cir. 1994)); infra text 
accompanying notes 140–141. 
 26. See United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id.  See generally Katyal, supra note 2, at 1309–10. 
 29. See Ohlin, supra note 2, at 169–70; Katyal, supra note 2, at 1309–10. 
 30. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915) (ruling on a conspiracy to conceal 
property from a bankruptcy trustee). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id.  It should be noted that Rabinowich does not directly analyze conspiracy as it is put 
forth in the statute at issue in this Note (i.e., 21 U.S.C. § 846).  Rather, the case addresses conspiracy in 
§ 37 of the Criminal Code, which is a predecessor to 18 U.S.C. § 371.  See Statute of Limitations, supra 
note 12, at 3.  Section 37 does differ from § 846.  For example, § 371 requires the government to prove 
an overt act of an agreement, while § 846 does not.  Despite this fact, the reasoning behind conspiracy, 
especially the need to distinguish it from the substantive offense, remains constant.  Compare 
Rabinowich, 238 U.S. at 88, with United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 15 (1994) (Shabani directly 
interprets § 371 while Rabinowich does not). 
4
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B. Standard for Lesser Included Offense Instructions 
It is not unusual for a defendant to request a lesser included offense 
instruction when charged with conspiracy to possess with the intent to 
distribute.35  A court will instruct the jury that it is allowed to convict 
the defendant of simple conspiracy to possess if the jury finds that the 
elements of the lesser offense are met and if the prosecution does not 
prove all of the elements of the greater offense.36  The standards for 
requiring the instruction for a lesser included offense are relatively the 
same in each circuit. 
The First Circuit mapped out the elements required to allow a lesser 
included offense instruction in United States v. Boidi.37  To allow the 
instruction, 1) the lesser offense must be included in the offense 
charged, 2) “a contested fact must separate the two offenses, and 3) the 
evidence would permit a jury to rationally find [the defendant] guilty of 
the lesser included offense and acquit him of the greater.”38  The Tenth 
Circuit uses the same prongs and elaborates by explaining that a lesser 
offense is included in a greater when the lesser has “some but not all of 
the elements” of the greater.39  It also rephrases the second prong, 
requiring a contested fact to separate the offenses by holding that “the 
elements differentiating the two offenses are in dispute.”40  Although the 
phrasing of the circuits is varied, the meaning behind the elements is 
virtually the same.41  For the purpose of clarity, this Casenote will refer 
to the prongs as 1) the “lesser offense included within the greater” 
prong, 2) the “contested fact in dispute” prong, and 3) the “rational jury” 
prong. 
The Sixth Circuit has similar elements in a slightly reorganized way 
that should not substantially affect a court’s analysis.42  The Sixth 
Circuit’s first requirement is that “the elements of the lesser offense are 
 
 35. See, e.g., United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2009); Unites States v. Gilmore, 
438 Fed. App’x 654, 657 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. LaPointe, 690 F.3d 434, 438–39 (6th Cir. 
2012). 
 36. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 439. 
 37. Boidi, 568 F.3d at 27. 
 38. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (citing United States v. Ferreira, 625 F.2d 1030, 
1031 (1st Cir. 1980)) (quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 39. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657 (citing United States v. Mullins, 613 F.3d 1273, 1284 (10th 
Cir. 2010)). 
 40. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657 (citing Mullins, 613 F.3d at 1284).  The court also adds an 
element to the beginning of its analysis by requiring a proper request for a jury instruction. 
 41. The lesser included offense prongs can be traced back to the United States Supreme Court 
case, Sansone v. United States.  Therefore, the analysis in every circuit should track Sansone’s.  See 
Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349–50 (1965).  
 42. See United States v. LaPointe, 690 F.3d 434, 439 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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identical to part of the elements of the greater.”43  This is a variation on 
the First and Tenth Circuits’ phrasing of the first prong, but this prong 
holds the same meaning among the three circuits.  The Sixth Circuit also 
requires that “the evidence would support a conviction on the lesser 
offense . . . .”44  This is simply a way of stating that the jury could find 
the defendant guilty on the lesser offense.  It is the same as the First and 
Tenth Circuits’ third prongs, except that, on its own, it does not require 
the jury’s ability to acquit on the greater offense.45  That aspect is 
included in the Sixth Circuit’s next prong: “the proof on the element or 
elements differentiating the two crimes is sufficiently disputed so that a 
jury could consistently acquit on the greater offense and convict on the 
lesser.”46  This combines the First and Tenth Circuits’ second and third 
prongs.47  Although there is a difference in language, all of the versions 
can be traced back to a 1965 Supreme Court case that interpreted 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(c) and should have the same 
application.48  For this reason, when addressing the three prongs, this 
Casenote will refer to the organization adopted in the First and Tenth 
Circuits.49 
C. Boidi: Requiring Lesser Included Offense Instruction 
Scott Boidi was convicted on criminal charges of embezzlement; 
Racketeer, Influenced, and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 
violations; and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute.50  At trial, 
the United States presented testimony that the defendant had shared the 
drugs with his wife and “uneven testimony” on whether the defendant 
shared them with his other friends.51  At the appellate level, the 
defendant challenged the district court’s denial of his request for a lesser 
included offense jury instruction.52  The First Circuit held that 
“conspiracy to possess” is a lesser included offense of “conspiracy to 
 
 43. Id. (quoting United States v. Colon, 268 F.3d 367, 373 (6th Cir. 2001)).  Like the Tenth 
Circuit, the Sixth Circuit also adds an element at the beginning of their analysis requiring a defendant to 
properly request the jury instruction. 
 44. Id. at 439 (quoting Colon, 268 F.3d at 373). 
 45. See id. at 439; United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2009); Gilmore, 438 Fed. 
App’x at 657. 
 46. LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 439 (quoting Colon, 268 F.3d at 373). 
 47. See id. at 439; Boidi, 568 F.3d at 27; Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657. 
 48. Sansone, 380 U.S. at 349–50. 
 49. This Note will continue to use the shortened descriptive names used above.  Again, they are 
1) the lesser offense included within the greater prong, 2) the contested fact in dispute prong, and 3) 
rational jury prong. 
 50. Boidi, 568 F.3d at 26–27. 
 51. Id. at 26. 
 52. Id. at 27. 
6
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss1/6
2013] CONSPIRACY & LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES: LAPOINTE 263 
possess with intent to distribute,” and the district court erred in not 
granting the instruction request.53  As a result, the convictions for 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute were vacated.54 
In Boidi, the government did not dispute that the substantive offense 
of possession is a lesser included offense of possession with intent to 
distribute, but instead argued that conspiracy to do so was entirely 
distinguishable.55  The United States asserted that the agreement to 
possess a drug is a wholly different agreement than one to possess with 
intent to distribute, and therefore, conspiracies to do either are 
completely different crimes.56 
The First Circuit, rejecting the prosecution’s argument, initially 
pointed out that the government’s stance on the issue had been 
inconsistent, citing an instance where the prosecution had conceded that 
the lesser conspiracy was included in the greater.57  The First Circuit 
also recognized that several courts, including their own, had assumed 
that such a lesser included instruction may be granted but had not issued 
a formal holding on the point.58 
In addressing the substance of the issue, the First Circuit held that the 
elements of the lesser offense were included in the greater, meeting the 
first prong of the lesser included offense instruction analysis.59  The 
court found that “‘conspiracy to possess drugs with intent to distribute’ 
can easily be said to be a ‘conspiracy to possess drugs’ with one added 
element, namely, that the parties also shared aim that the possessed 
drugs then be distributed.”60  But the court elaborated on this factor, 
requiring that the core facts of the lesser and greater offenses derive 
from a common scenario.61  In other words, while a lesser included 
instruction was proper here, it would not be proper in cases where a 
defendant charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 
requests an instruction for conspiracy to simply possess based on an 
agreement with different people at a different time.62  
The government contended that the core facts were different and not 
 
 53. Id. at 29. 
 54. Id. at 32. 
 55. Id. at 27. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Id. at 27–28 (citing United States v. White, 972 F.2d 590, 596 (5th Cir. 1992)). 
 58. Id. at 28 (citing United States v. Arroyo, 546 F.3d 54, 56 (1st Cir. 2008)). 
 59. See id. at 28. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (using the example “[i]f the government charges . . . conspiracy to possess with intent to 
distribute heroin in New York in 2004 but the evidence arguably showed only a conspiracy to possess in 
San Francisco in 2007, this would call only for an instruction that the jury not convict if the government 
proves a conspiracy different than that charged”).  
7
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overlapping because different witnesses would be required to prove the 
lesser conspiracy.63  The court again rejected the government’s 
argument holding that “the lesser . . . offense has to be a version 
of . . . the same factual scenario as the greater offense” and the only 
difference is that the added element distinguishing the greater need not 
be proved.64  The core facts that the government presented included 
Boidi buying drugs from the dealer and sharing them with others.65  
Although these facts were meant to prove conspiracy to distribute, by 
their nature, they were also sufficient to prove conspiracy to possess.66  
For that reason, the court declared that “[t]he witnesses that the 
government chose to prove the greater offense are the proof of the lesser 
included one.”67 
The First Circuit then took on the final rational jury prong and asked 
whether a jury could reasonably convict on the lesser offense while 
acquitting on the greater.68  The government argued that the fact that the 
defendant shared drugs with his wife was enough for a reasonable jury 
to find that he conspired to distribute.69  The court agreed that the 
defendant did indeed share the drugs with his wife, but concluded that 
conspiracy to distribute is not that same as the substantive offense.70  
While the defendant sharing drugs with his wife may have easily proved 
actual distribution, it did not automatically follow that the defendant was 
guilty of conspiracy to distribute.71  Despite carrying out the substantive 
act, the defendant must agree to join, know of, and intend to participate 
in the conspiracy before being convicted of conspiracy.72  Entirely 
different elements are required to prove conspiracy as opposed to the 
substantive crime, and a jury could find that the defendant did not 
conspire to distribute, despite the fact that he actually distributed.73  
Further, according to the court, it would not be unreasonable for a jury 
to find that the defendant did not conspire to distribute, but did conspire 
to possess based on these facts.74 
The court then combined the above legal analysis with several policy 
 
 63. Id. at 28–29. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See generally id. at 25–26. 
 66. See id. at 29. 
 67. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. Id. 
8
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concerns.75  First, courts are typically wary of imposing conspiracy on 
low-level members of top-down organizations.76  The First Circuit 
found the government’s argument particularly suspect in cases such as 
this, where the prosecution could have more easily charged the 
substantive crime alone, but opted for conspiracy to gain certain 
advantages.77  The court then addressed the purpose of conspiracy laws, 
reasoning that the purpose is not met when the intent to support a 
conspiracy is absent.78  The lesser included instruction should be 
allowed to ensure that the defendant is being charged with a conspiracy 
that he indeed had the requisite intent to commit.79  Finally, the court 
recognized the policy of avoiding injustice by illustrating that when a 
lesser included offense is not allowed, the jury may be faced with the 
choice of convicting a defendant on a greater conspiracy that he was not 
a part of, or complete acquittal, neither of which may be the appropriate 
outcome.80 
D. Gilmore: Not Requiring Lesser Included Offense Instruction 
In United States v. Gilmore, the Tenth Circuit reviewed a district 
court’s decision denying defendant Jerry Gilmore’s request for a jury 
instruction on a lesser included offense.81  He was a low-level agent in a 
complicated hierarchical drug distribution organization.82  The 
defendant admitted to sharing the drugs he received with friends and 
admitted knowing he was transporting others to solicit drugs.83  The 
Tenth Circuit held that the instruction for a lesser included offense was 
not required where the dispute does not concern the elements that 
differentiate the lesser and greater offenses.84  In other words, the 
 
 75. Id.at 29–30. 
 76. Id. at 29.  The court refers to these types of conspiracies as vertical conspiracies.  These 
conspiracies involve members at the top making final decisions, and the lower members executing those 
decisions.  This is opposed to horizontal conspiracies, where the decision making is more equally shared 
among the members.  Ohlin, supra note 2, at 190, 192, 194. 
 77. Boidi, 568 F.3d at 29.  The court does not elaborate on these advantages, but they can be 
implied.  There are perceived advantages in the admissibility of hearsay evidence and the admissibility 
of coconspirator acts.  Also, many defense attorneys would argue that conspiracies are more likely to 
confuse the trier of fact to the advantage of the prosecutor.  See Paul Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal 
Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65 GEO. L.J. 925, 940–41 (1977).  In addition, “one of the more 
common ways to use RICO is to charge a conspiracy to commit a RICO violation under 18 U.S.C. 
[§] 1962(d)(2000).”  Katyal, supra note 2, at  n.112. 
 78. Boidi, 568 F.3d at 30. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Unites States v. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x 654, 655 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 82. Id. at 656. 
 83. Id. at 657. 
 84. Id. at 658. 
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contested fact in dispute prong (the second prong) of the lesser included 
offense analysis was not met.  The court also found that the third prong 
was not satisfied because a jury would not be able to reasonably convict 
on the lesser conspiracy while acquitting of the greater.85 
In finding that the second prong was not met, the court determined 
that the elements differentiating the two offenses were not in dispute.86  
Rather, the disputed issue was “whether Mr. Gilmore was a member of 
the conspiracy or just a consumer.”87  Had the dispute been whether the 
conspiracy’s goal was to distribute versus possess, the Tenth Circuit 
would have allowed the instruction.88  Instead, the court determined that 
the dispute was whether the defendant was involved in the only alleged 
conspiracy, and the defendant was in essence asking for an instruction 
on a completely different conspiracy from the one charged.89 
According to the Tenth Circuit, the defendant also failed to prove the 
third rational jury prong.90  A jury could not rationally convict on the 
lesser conspiracy while acquitting on the greater because all of the 
evidence demonstrated that distribution was central to the conspiracy.91  
The court pointed to the fact that the defendant’s own testimony 
expressed that he shared the drugs with friends, “which bears on the 
distribution aspect of the conspiracy.”92  As a result, the defendant’s 
convictions were affirmed in whole.93 
III. LAPOINTE OPINION 
James LaPointe was part of an oxycodone trafficking organization 
that shipped pills from Florida to Tennessee.94  Dustin Wallace received 
the pills in Tennessee and distributed them to buyers.95  Law 
enforcement recordings showed LaPointe requesting oxycodone from 
Wallace, discussing potential buyers, and addressing the possibility of 
LaPointe selling Oxycontin to Wallace.96  At trial, LaPointe denied 
involvement in the distribution conspiracy, explaining that the 
conversations were intended to deceive Wallace into providing larger 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 657–58. 
 88. Id. at 658. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 661. 
 94. United States v. LaPointe, 690 F.3d 434, 438 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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quantities of drugs for LaPointe’s personal use.97  LaPointe was charged 
with conspiring to possess oxycodone with intent to distribute.98  At the 
end of the trial, LaPointe requested a jury instruction on the lesser 
included offense of conspiracy to possess.99  The district court denied 
the instruction, and the court convicted LaPointe of conspiracy to 
possess with intent to distribute.100  On appeal, the Sixth Circuit 
reversed.101 
The organization of the Sixth Circuit’s opinion differs from the First 
and Tenth Circuits’ because it combines the analysis of the second 
contested fact in dispute prong and the third rational jury prong.102  
Rather than analyzing the two prongs separately, the court addressed 
whether the conspiracy’s differentiating facts were in dispute in the 
same step of its analysis of whether a reasonable jury could convict on 
the lesser and not the greater conspiracy.103 
The Sixth Circuit’s first step was to ask whether the elements of the 
lesser conspiracy were included in the greater.104  The court declared 
that it is well-settled that a conspiracy to possess is a lesser included 
offense of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute.105  The Sixth 
Circuit reasoned that the lower court placed too much emphasis on how 
the indictment was drafted because the district court based its holding on 
the idea that “[a]n offense can be charged conjunctively and proven 
disjunctively.”106  A prior Sixth Circuit case had held that governments 
have the right to charge in the conjunctive so the grand jury can find 
probable cause for all of the alternative theories that go forward to 
trial.107  “Juries, on the other hand, may convict a defendant on any 
theory contained in the indictment.  As a result, judges read jury 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  He was also charged with attempt to possess oxycodone.  Id. at 438–39. 
 99. Id. at 439. 
 100. Id.  The conviction on attempt was affirmed.  Id. at 444. 
 101. Id. at 444. 
 102. Compare id. at 439, with United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2009), and United 
States v. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x 654, 657 (10th Cir. 2011) (LaPointe, the Sixth Circuit opinion, 
combines the contested fact in dispute prong with the rational jury prong, while Boidi and Gilmore, the 
First and Tenth Circuit opinions respectively, do not). 
 103. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441–43. 
 104. Id. at 439–40. 
 105. Id. at 440 (citing Boidi, 568 F.3d at 28).  Boidi cites to several cases that have “concluded or 
assumed that a less serious conspiracy can be a lesser included offense of a similar but greater one.”  Id.  
See, e.g., Unites States v. Carroll, 140 F. App’x 168, 169 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); United States v. 
Ruhbayan, 406 F.3d 292, 295–96 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Vaandering, 50 F.3d 696, 703 (9th 
Cir. 1995).  For a list of several more, see Boidi, 568 F.3d at n.2. 
 106. LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 440 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 107. Id. (citing United States v. McAuliffe, 490 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Cornell, 162 F. App’x 404, 415 (6th Cir. 2006)).   
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instructions in the disjunctive.”108  The reasoning for this doctrine is for 
societal reassurance in grand jury thoroughness, and that rationale does 
not follow in the reasoning behind lesser included offense 
instructions.109  At trial, the prosecution must only succeed on one of the 
indictment’s theories, and not granting an appropriate lesser included 
offense instruction would improperly place a greater burden on the 
defendant.110 
In the next step of the opinion, the Sixth Circuit held that evidence of 
the element differentiating the two crimes would support a conviction on 
the lesser offense and acquittal on the greater.111  The government 
argued that the first prong was not met because no such lesser 
conspiracy existed, and the only issue at trial was whether the defendant 
was part of the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute.112  
According to the government, because the prosecution only presented 
facts to show distribution, it was only alleging conspiracy to distribute.  
The argument followed that the only objective of the conspiracy was to 
distribute, and the objective of simple possession was not alleged.  
Therefore, the government’s stance was that there could be no dispute as 
to the differentiating elements because there was only one conspiracy: 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute.113  
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the government was inferring that 
conspiracy can only have one objective, and then recognized that it is 
well-settled law that a conspiracy can have multiple objectives.114  The 
correct question for a court to ask is “whether there is ‘some core of 
facts that is common to the scenario that the government sought to prove 
and the one that the defendant claims to show only a lesser included 
offense,’” and not whether the conspiracy would be an entirely different 
charge.115  In LaPointe, the only differentiating fact was whether the 
defendant shared the intent to distribute as part of the conspiracy.116  
The government is required to show that the defendant was more than 
just active in the conspiracy; it “must separately prove a defendant’s 
intention to join each objective of the conspiracy.”117  In conclusion, 
because common core facts can prove the lesser and greater 
conspiracies, the lower court erred in not granting the instruction, and 
 
 108. LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 440 (citing Cornell, 162 F. App’x at 415).  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 441. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (citing Ingram, 360 U.S. at 670). 
 115. Id. at 441 (quoting Boidi, 568 F.3d at 28). 
 116. Id. at 441–42. 
 117. Id. at 442. 
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therefore the Sixth Circuit reversed the pertinent conspiracy counts.118 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Conspiracies Can Have Multiple Objectives 
Although the Sixth Circuit was correct that conspiracies have 
multiple objectives, it mischaracterized the government and the Tenth 
Circuit’s argument.  In Boidi, Gilmore, and LaPointe, the government 
essentially argued that the elements differentiating the lesser and greater 
conspiracies were not in dispute because conspiracy to possess with 
intent to distribute was the only charged offense.119  According to the 
government, any proposed agreement to simply possess is a totally 
separate agreement, and no dispute between agreements existed because 
no agreement to simply possess was charged or proven.120  In LaPointe, 
the government asserted that “no evidence supports a conviction for 
conspiracy to possess because there was no such conspiracy.  The only 
conspiracy [the defendant] could join was the one . . . to distribute 
drugs.”121  The Sixth Circuit inaccurately characterized the 
government’s position as an implication “that a conspiracy may only 
have one objective rather than multiple.”122  Although this “multiple 
objective” aspect of conspiracy is extremely important to understand 
how to correctly enforce the law, the Sixth Circuit’s characterization of 
the government’s (and by implication the Tenth Circuit’s) understanding 
of this issue is misleading.123  This Part of the Casenote first discusses 
the importance of the multiple objective aspect of conspiracy and then 
addresses why the Tenth Circuit’s position is not as simple as the Sixth 
Circuit interpreted it. 
1. The Sixth Circuit Correctly Analyzes Conspiracies’ Multiple 
Objectives 
Despite the mischaracterization of the government and the Tenth 
Circuit’s argument, the Sixth Circuit correctly focused on the “multiple 
objective” aspect of conspiracy.  As the court pointed out, the 
understanding of conspiracy is well-settled, as the Supreme Court ruled 
 
 118. Id. at 443. 
 119. Id. at 441; United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2009); Unites States v. Gilmore, 
438 Fed. App’x 654, 657–58 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 120. LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441; Boidi, 568 F.3d at 28; Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657–58. 
 121. LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441. 
 122. Id. at 441. 
 123. See generally id. 
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on the issue in Rabinowich and Ingram.124  Rabinowich held that “a 
single conspiracy might have for its object the violation of two or more 
criminal laws . . . ” even if the time limits of the substantive offenses 
vary.125  This understanding is partly rooted in the policy behind 
conspiracy.  As Rabinowich describes it: 
For two or more to confederate and combine together to commit or cause 
to be committed a breach of the criminal laws, is an offense of the gravest 
character, sometimes quite outweighing, in injury to the public, the mere 
commission of the contemplated crime.  It involves deliberate plotting to 
subvert the laws, educating and preparing the conspirators for further and 
habitual criminal practices.  And it is characterized by secrecy, rendering 
it difficult of detection, requiring more time for its discovery, and adding 
to the importance of punishing it when discovered.126 
The fact that a defendant agreed to commit a lesser substantive offense 
required to commit the overall offense does not degrade the effects that 
Rabinowich details.127  An agreement to aid in the possession of drugs 
still helps conspirators commit future crimes, “is characterized by 
secrecy,” and is much harder to prevent than the simple apprehension of 
a lone actor.128  In Ingram, the Supreme Court expanded upon 
Rabinowich to solidify the understanding that a conspiracy may have 
multiple objectives and reinforced the idea that enhanced dangers of 
conspiracy are still present when a defendant conspires to commit a 
minor objective.129  The heightened danger of conspiracy exists whether 
the defendant agrees to distribute the drugs or simply possess them.130  
Further, the agreement to possess aids the efficiency of the agreement of 
the greater conspiracy to distribute.131  For these reasons, a defendant 
who is part of a larger conspiracy only because of his agreement to a 
smaller objective needed to facilitate the larger conspiracy is still 
considered a member of the conspiracy.132  If the defendant who only 
agreed to a lesser objective is still part of the conspiracy, it naturally 
follows that the lesser conspiracy is a lesser included offense in the 
 
 124. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915); Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 
677–80 (1959). 
 125. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. at 86. 
 126. Id. at 88 (emphasis added). 
 127. See id. at 86, 88. 
 128. See id. at 88. 
 129. See Ingram, 360 U.S. at 679–80. 
 130. See Rabinowich, 238 U.S. at 86, 88. 
 131. See Ohlin, supra note 2, at 169–70; Katyal, supra note 2, at 1309–10. 
 132. See Rabinowich, 238 U.S. at 86; Ingram, 360 U.S. at 678; United States v. LaPointe, 690 
F.3d 434, 441 (6th Cir. 2012).  This does not mean that such a defendant should be guilty of the overall 
conspiracy.  Rather, they should be guilty of a lesser conspiracy.  Intent is still required, and the 
defendant has intent for the lesser, not the greater conspiracy.  Supra text accompanying notes 14–19. 
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greater conspiracy, not a separate offense, as the Tenth Circuit 
asserted.133 
Applying this understanding to the lesser included offense prongs, the 
multiple objective analysis described above can address whether 
elements differentiating the greater and lesser conspiracies are in 
dispute.134  The Tenth Circuit held that there was no dispute in the 
contested facts that differentiated the lesser and greater offenses, so the 
second contested fact in dispute prong was not met.135  To determine 
this, the court adopted the government’s argument that because there 
was only one conspiracy alleged (the conspiracy to possess with intent 
to distribute), and this was the only objective charged.136  According to 
the Tenth Circuit, the dispute in facts between the government and the 
defendant was whether the defendant committed the greater charged 
conspiracy, or committed no conspiracy at all.137  “Because the dispute 
was not about the objective of the charged conspiracy,” there was no 
contested fact between a lesser and greater offense.138 
The Sixth Circuit held that because a conspiracy can have multiple 
objectives, and because possession is a lesser objective within 
distribution, the lesser conspiracy in LaPointe was within the greater.139  
That being said, it does not necessarily follow that a lesser conspiracy is 
always included within a greater.  A lesser conspiracy instruction may 
not be granted if the lesser included offense is based on separate facts 
than the greater conspiracy charged.140  For example, a defendant’s 
instruction request should be denied “[i]f the government charges and 
seeks to prove a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin in 
New York in 2005 but the evidence arguably showed only a conspiracy 
to possess in San Francisco in 2007.”141  For this reason, the Sixth 
Circuit did not ask whether the different conspiracy was a separate 
crime.  Instead, the court inquired “whether there [was] ‘some core of 
facts . . . common to the scenario that the government sought to prove 
and one that the defendant claim[ed] to show . . . .’”142  
 
 133. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441; Unites States v. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x 654, 657–58 (10th 
Cir. 2011).  This concept that a conspiracy can have multiple objectives has its limits.  Kotteakos v. 
United States held that “separate adventures of like character” cannot be put together in the same 
enterprise.  Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 769 (1946). 
 134. LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441–42. 
 135. See Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 658. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441–42. 
 140. See id. at 441 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 27 F.3d 1009, 1015 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
 141. United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 142. LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441 (quoting Boidi, 568 F.3d at 28). 
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In asking whether the core facts of the conspiracies overlap, the court 
focused on the nature of the objectives of the conspiracy to see if the 
lesser objective was actually consumed in the greater objective of the 
conspiracy.143  If the facts overlap, then a defendant only agreeing to a 
lesser objective in a greater conspiracy still perpetrates the dangers that 
Rabinowich sought to avoid and should be held accountable for his 
agreement.144  For instance, if a defendant agrees to possess drugs for 
the purpose of completing the primary objective of distribution, then 
that defendant is making the commission of the crime more efficient, 
facilitating the criminal education of co-conspirators, and furthering the 
secrecy of the crime.145  The policy behind conspiracy law necessitates 
treating this as one conspiracy.146  If the core facts that the prosecution 
asserts to prove conspiracy to distribute can also prove conspiracy to 
possess, the lesser conspiracy to possess is inherently included in the 
greater conspiracy to distribute, and the defendant may request a lesser 
included offense instruction.147  The defendant’s guilt of the lesser or 
greater conspiracy turns on which objective the defendant agreed to, 
intended, and had knowledge of.148  If the facts do not overlap, then the 
court is faced with two separate conspiracies, and the Tenth Circuit’s 
approach would be correct.149 
2. The Sixth Circuit Mischaracterizes the Tenth Circuit’s Understanding 
of Multiple Objectives 
The Sixth Circuit stated that the Tenth Circuit’s and the government’s 
arguments “implie[d] that conspiracy may have only one objective.”150  
Although the Tenth Circuit did not adequately account for the “multiple 
objective” character of conspiracy, it is unlikely that the court 
consciously disregarded settled law on the issue.151  More likely, the 
Tenth Circuit confused the second contested fact in dispute prong with 
the third rational jury prong.152  
 
 143. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441–42. 
 144. See id; United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915). 
 145. See Rabinowich, 238 U.S. at 88; Ohlin, supra note 2, at 169–70; Katyal, supra note 2, at 
1309–10. 
 146. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441–42. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See United Stated v. Turner, 319 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 149. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441; supra text accompanying notes 140–141.  See generally 
United States v. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x 654 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 150. LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441. 
 151. E.g., United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86 (1915); Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 
672, 678–79 (1959).  See generally, Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x 654. 
 152. See generally, Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657–58. 
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First, it should be noted that, on its facts, it is possible that Gilmore 
reached the correct conclusion.  Even if the Tenth Circuit properly 
applied the second and third prongs, it could still have found against 
Gilmore and affirmed the denial of the instruction.153  It could be argued 
that the facts of Gilmore are distinguishable from Boidi and LaPointe to 
the extent that a rational jury in Gilmore could be less able to reasonably 
convict on the lesser conspiracy and acquit on the greater.154  The 
government possessed more evidence indicating the defendant’s 
knowledge of, and intent to join, the conspiracy to distribute.155  For 
instance, Gilmore repeatedly transported a drug dealer to distribute 
drugs to customers and even collected money from customers on one 
occasion.156  This evidence could be extremely indicative of intent to 
conspire to distribute, although it would not necessitate such a 
finding.157  The evidence of shared intent was less clear in Boidi and 
LaPointe.  In Boidi, the defendant had shared the drugs with friends and 
talked about diluting the drugs for potential distribution, but these facts 
did not demand a finding that Boidi agreed to join a conspiracy to 
distribute.158  In LaPointe, a reasonable jury could find that although 
LaPointe requested drugs for distribution, he was actually deceiving the 
dealer to give him drugs on credit for his own use.159 
Although this distinction may justify the Tenth Circuit’s result based 
on the third rational jury prong of the lesser included offense analysis, it 
should not be applied to the second contested fact in dispute prong.160  
When analyzing whether a contested fact may separate the two offenses, 
the Tenth Circuit should have focused only on whether the evidence 
proved the lesser conspiracy minus one element (that being the intent to 
conspire to distribute).161  To answer the second contested fact in 
dispute prong, the court should have only asked whether the facts 
presented could show that Gilmore conspired to possess, no matter what 
the additional facts were that the prosecution put forth to prove 
conspiracy to distribute.162  The likelihood that Gilmore actually 
 
 153. See generally id. at 655–57. 
 154. Compare id., with United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2009), and LaPointe, 
690 F.3d at 438 (In Gilmore, the facts make it less likely than in Boidi and LaPointe that the defendant 
was only guilty of conspiracy to possess, rather than conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute). 
 155. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 656. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See id.; Boidi, 568 F.3d at 29 (holding that the substantive act and knowledge of the greater 
objective does not require a finding of intent to commit the greater conspiracy). 
 158. Boidi, 568 F.3d at 26.  Keep in mind the difference between committing a substantive crime 
and a conspiracy to commit that crime.  See supra text accompanying notes 26–29. 
 159. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 438. 
 160. See generally Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657–58. 
 161. See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 28–29. 
 162. See id. 
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conspired to distribute had no bearing on whether Gilmore disputed a 
fact that would determine whether he was guilty of conspiracy to 
distribute.163  The court should not have focused on the likelihood that 
the facts may or may not have proven that element.164  
The question of likelihood is reserved for the third rational jury 
prong.  This third prong asks whether “the evidence would permit a jury 
to rationally find [the defendant] guilty of the lesser included offense 
and acquit him of the greater.”165  In regard to conspiracy, the second 
contested fact in dispute prong asks: Does the defendant dispute a fact 
that determines whether he is guilty of the lesser or greater 
conspiracy?166  Part of the analysis of this question lies in whether the 
lesser and greater conspiracies are rooted in the same core facts.167  This 
question is not the same as whether the evidence would allow a rational 
jury to convict on the lesser conspiracy but not the greater.168  
Incorrectly applying the rational jury prong analysis to the second 
contested fact in dispute prong may lead to incorrect results in future 
cases.169  Future courts adopting the Tenth Circuit approach could deny 
a lesser included offense instruction on facts that resemble Boidi and 
LaPointe where a jury could reasonably convict on the lesser and acquit 
on the greater.170  If the evidence infers that the defendant conspired to 
distribute, but does not necessitate that finding, a court could use the 
Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Gilmore to deny an instruction based on the 
idea that the defendant is alleging an entirely different offense and not a 
contested fact in dispute.171  This court would find against the 
defendant’s request for an instruction before even addressing the 
rational jury prong.172  Strict adherence to prong application is vital 
because of the complex nature of conspiracy.173  Without courts’ 
relentless attention to detail, the intent requirement of conspiracy can 
become even more confused, resulting in unjust outcomes, as described 
below in Parts B and C.174  
When the Sixth Circuit described the Tenth Circuit’s holding as one 
that simply ignores the concept that conspiracy can have multiple 
 
 163. See id.  See generally Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 655–59. 
 164. See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 28–31. 
 165. Id. at 27 (alteration in original) (quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973)). 
 166. See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 28. 
 167. See supra text accompanying notes 140–141. 
 168. See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 27. 
 169. See generally id. 
 170. See generally id. at 25–26; United States v. LaPointe, 690 F.3d 434, 438 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 171. See generally United States v. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x 654, 657–58 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 172. See generally id. 
 173. See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 30. 
 174. See infra Part IV.B–C. 
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objectives, the Sixth Circuit missed the opportunity to correct the true 
misunderstanding of the Tenth Circuit.  The Sixth Circuit’s 
misunderstanding of the nature of the split set the opinion back.175  The 
court should have explained that the Tenth Circuit inappropriately 
combined the second contested facts in dispute prong with the rational 
jury prong.  The LaPointe opinion should have demonstrated the 
difference between asking whether the defendant disputes a fact that 
distinguished the lesser and greater conspiracies (second contested fact 
in dispute prong) and whether a jury could rationally convict on the 
lesser but not the greater conspiracy (third prong).176  The Sixth Circuit 
failed to use LaPointe to clarify the correct lesser included instruction 
analysis, and as a result, failed to provide adequate guidance to future 
courts addressing this complex issue. 
B. Requiring Intent for the Correct Conspiracy 
Although the Sixth Circuit accurately applies the intent requirement 
for conspiracy, the court does not adequately address the intent element 
to distinguish itself from the Tenth Circuit and provide guidance to other 
courts.177  To be eligible for a lesser included offense instruction, the 
jury must be able to rationally convict on the lesser offense while 
acquitting of the greater, among other factors described above.178  For a 
jury to convict on any conspiracy, lesser or greater, the jury must find 
intent to join the alleged conspiracy, among other factors.179  Two mens 
rea issues can serve as red herrings of intent to conspire: intent to 
commit the substantive offense and knowledge of the conspiracy.180  
Neither can be equated to intent to conspire, and neither compels a 
finding of such intent.181 
1. The Tenth Circuit Misunderstands the Intent Requirement of 
Conspiracy 
It is possible for a court to treat two conspiracies as separate crimes 
and still achieve the goal of punishing the conspirator who agreed to a 
lesser objective by convicting him on the greater conspiracy.182  This is 
 
 175. See generally LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441. 
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 160–168. 
 177. See generally LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 439–443. 
 178. LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 439 (quoting Colon, 268 F.3d at 373); see supra text accompanying 
note 38. 
 179. United Stated v. Turner, 319 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 180. See United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 181. See id. 
 182. E.g., Unites States v. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x 654, 657 (10th Cir. 2011). 
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indeed what happened in Gilmore.183  Although the ends seem to 
comport with the underlying policy goal of conspiracy laws, this 
approach is an inadequate application of intent to conspire.  Conviction 
under conspiracy requires at least the degree of intent to commit the 
substantive crime.184  If the defendant only truly intended to join a 
conspiracy to commit a lesser objective, he did not possess the intent 
required to commit the greater conspiracy.  While conviction on the 
greater conspiracy punishes the general membership to the conspiracy, it 
over convicts a defendant who did not intend to join a greater 
conspiracy, trampling the standard of mens rea in American criminal 
law.185 
Intent to join a conspiracy can be easily confused with intent to 
commit the underlying substantive crime.186  In Boidi, the First Circuit 
recognized that the defendant “clearly possesse[d] cocaine with intent to 
distribute,” but that does not necessitate a finding that the defendant 
conspired to distribute drugs.187  Situations may easily arise in which a 
defendant may commit an act, such as distribution, without agreeing or 
conspiring to do such an act, and a court may mistake the intent to do 
the act for intent to conspire.188 
The Tenth Circuit fell into this trap.  Although some of Gilmore’s 
facts may be argued to indicate intent to conspire to distribute drugs, the 
court focused too much on the defendant’s clear intent to distribute.189  
The court cited the defendant’s own testimony when it asserted “that he 
obtained methamphetamine from [other conspirators] and ‘shared’ that 
methamphetamine with friends, which bears on the distribution aspect of 
conspiracy.”190  As discussed earlier, conspiracy laws have a purpose 
wholly separate from the punishment of the underlying offense, and the 
Tenth Circuit ignored this by affirming the conviction for conspiracy 
based on intent to commit the substantive offense.191  Although intent to 
commit a substantive crime may infer intent to conspire, that fact does 
not compel that finding, as the Tenth Circuit implies in Gilmore.192 
The Tenth Circuit also appears to have inaccurately equated 
 
 183. Id. 
 184. Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678 (1959) (quoting Developments in the Law of 
Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 939 (1959)). 
 185. See Id. at 678–79. 
 186. See United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2009).  E.g., Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 
658. 
 187. Boidi, 568 F.3d at 29. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 658. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915). 
 192. See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 29–30.  See generally Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657–58. 
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knowledge of a conspiracy with intent to commit such conspiracy.193  
To prove intent, the government must prove the defendant has 
knowledge of the conspiracy, but it does not automatically follow that 
intent to join the conspiracy is necessarily implied from knowledge that 
the conspiracy exists.194  Knowledge may bear on intent, but a 
reasonable jury could find that a defendant with knowledge of a 
conspiracy of an offense, and who committed that underlying offense, 
did not have the requisite intent to join the conspiracy.195  “Evidence 
that a buyer intends to resell the product instead of personally 
consuming it does not necessarily establish that the buyer has joined the 
seller’s distribution conspiracy.  This is so even if the seller is aware of 
the buyer’s intent to resell.”196  In Boidi, the First Circuit accurately 
addressed the concerns with the confusion among intent to commit the 
substantive act, knowledge of the conspiracy, and intent to conspire, but 
the Sixth Circuit did not follow that lead.197 
2. The Sixth Circuit Does Not Adequately Address Intent or the Tenth 
Circuit’s Misunderstanding 
The First Circuit clearly recognized the inherent issues that may arise 
with intent in conspiracy.198  First, the court accurately parsed out the 
intent to commit the underlying crime from the intent to commit the 
conspiracy.199  Second, that court understood that while simple 
knowledge of co-conspirators’ acts may “permit a jury to infer . . . an 
agreement,” that knowledge does not compel such a finding.200 
The Sixth Circuit did not fully address the tenuous issue of intent 
required to convict on conspiracy.201  Rather, to determine whether the 
evidence could reasonably support a conviction on the lesser offense and 
not the greater, the court focused on the overlapping core facts.202  The 
court did point out that the only differentiating fact between the two 
conspiracies would be the intent to distribute and stated that “[t]he 
prosecution must separately prove a defendant’s intention to join each 
 
 193. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657–58. 
 194. See Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 677–78 (1959) (citing Direct Sales Co. v. United 
States, 319 U.S. 703, 711–12 (1943)); Boidi, 568 F.3d at 30 (citing Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 711). 
 195. See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 29–30. 
 196. Boidi, 568 F.3d at 30 (quoting United States v. Hawkins, 547 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
 197. See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 30. 
 198. See id. 
 199. Id. at 29. 
 200. Id. at 29–30 (citing Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711(1943)) (emphasis in 
original). 
 201. See generally United States v. LaPointe, 690 F.3d 434, 439–43 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 202. Id. at 441. 
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objective of the conspiracy.”203  But this brief analysis of intent failed to 
point out the understandable confusion that courts have between intent 
to commit conspiracy and intent to commit the substantive act.204  The 
Sixth Circuit also neglected to point out that knowledge of a conspiracy 
does not necessitate intent.205  Not including these aspects does not 
necessarily make the Sixth Circuit’s application and analysis flawed, but 
their inclusion could have aided future courts to better understand the 
true flaws in the Tenth Circuit’s decision and enforce the need for lesser 
included conspiracies in such instances.  Clarification on this complex 
issue is dire, and the Sixth Circuit missed its chance to provide adequate 
guidance. 
C. Avoiding Injustice 
The Sixth Circuit reached a result that protected against injustice in 
LaPointe but did not adequately emphasize lesser included instructions’ 
underlying policy of avoiding injustice to help future courts reach proper 
results.206  A major, if not primary, reason lesser included instructions 
are allowed is to ensure that the jury does not “stretch to convict the 
defendant of the greater crime.”207  This danger arises when the jury 
may not be convinced that the prosecution has proved its presented 
charge, but still believes the defendant committed an illegal act.208  It is 
likely that the jury may consider the conviction on the greater charge to 
be a lesser evil when compared to acquittal.209  A lesser included offense 
instruction removes from the jury the choice between two wrongs and 
allows a conviction on the true acts of the defendant, leading to a truer 
sense of justice.210  The Supreme Court has reinforced on multiple 
occasions the concept that a “third option” should be given to the jury to 
escape an “unwarranted conviction” of the defendant.211 
 
 203. Id. at 442. 
 204. See generally id. at 441–43. 
 205. See generally id. at 441–43. 
 206. See generally LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 439–43. 
 207. United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Flores, 968 
F.2d 1366, 1369 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Balthazard, 360 F.3d 309, 320 (1st Cir. 2004)). 
 208. Flores, 968 F.2d at 1369. 
 209. See id. 
 210. See id. 
 211. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 646 (1991); 
Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973).  This “third option” is not solely a pro-defendant 
concept.  It can work in the favor of the prosecution.  Certain jury pools may be more likely to acquit 
than convict of the charged conspiracy if the prosecution is unable to prove the necessary elements of 
the charged crime, even if the jury believes the defendant is guilty of a lesser crime.  In this scenario the 
prosecution may want to adopt the defense’s position in LaPointe to save a conviction by allowing a 
lesser included offense instruction to avoid acquittal. 
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The need to allow a lesser included offense instruction becomes more 
necessary when considering a charge of conspiracy.212  As explained 
above, intent to commit the substantive act can be easily confused with 
intent to conspire, and the intent to agree to a lesser objective within the 
conspiracy may be muddled as well.213  Allowing the lesser included 
offense instruction ensures that the prosecution proves the exact intent 
that is alleged to receive a conviction on the charged conspiracy.214 
The need for proper lesser included offense instructions cannot be 
overstated.  First, conspiracy to simply possess is a misdemeanor and 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute is a felony under federal 
law.215  This alone can lead to drastic sentencing variations that could 
solely depend on whether the lesser included instruction is allowed.  
Secondly, a ruling on the issue can have implications far beyond the 
charged conspiracy.216  In Boidi, the lower court’s refusal to grant the 
instruction not only affected the conspiracy, but also convictions that 
required felony conspiracy as a predicate act.217  The First Circuit did 
find that despite the lower court’s error, there were still enough 
convictions on predicate acts to support the RICO conviction, but it 
vacated the defendant’s “use of a communication facility to facilitate a 
drug crime” charge.218 
The fact that the prosecution may gain “atmospheric advantages” 
from charging a conspiracy as opposed to a substantive crime requires 
courts to pay strict attention to jury instructions during conspiracy cases 
to ensure the appropriate adjudication.219  In Boidi, the First Circuit 
realized that the government could have easily charged the defendant 
with the substantive crime without sacrificing the severity of the 
sentence for that particular offense.220  Instead, the government charged 
conspiracy to gain advantages in RICO and communication facility 
charges.221  For this reason, combined with the tenuous nature of intent 
in criminal conspiracy, “[t]he use of conspiracy doctrine in a vertical 
context has caused courts unease” and should lead all the circuits to be 
 
 212. See United States v. Boidi, 568 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 213. Id. at 29–30; see supra Part IV.B. 
 214. See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 30. 
 215. Id. at 31–32 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 843(b), 802(13); United States v. Baggett, 890 F.2d 1095, 
1098 (10th Cir. 1989)). 
 216. See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 31. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. (“In the indictment, the communications facility charge was tied to the conspiracy count, 
and the district court instructed the jury that it had to find that Boidi knowingly and intentionally used a 
communications facility to cause or facilitate the drug trafficking offense in count 5 (the conspiracy)”).  
Id. 
 219. See supra note 77. 
 220. Boidi, 568 F.3d at 29. 
 221. Id. at 29, 31; see supra note 77. 
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especially skeptical to ensure the avoidance of injustice.222 
Despite the First Circuit’s explanation of all of the potential unjust 
results that could arise from mistreatment of the lesser included 
conspiracy issue in Boidi, the Tenth Circuit completely ignored the 
issue.223  The Tenth Circuit’s strict and terse approach to application of 
the lesser included offense prongs failed to take into account the 
nuanced reasons that a lesser included offense instruction is allowed and 
how those reasons are amplified by conspiracy’s unusual nature.224  The 
Sixth Circuit took a step in the right direction, as it referenced the desire 
to avoid “unwarranted conviction[s]” in its general discussion of lesser 
included offense instructions.225  Unfortunately, the LaPointe opinion 
failed to go far enough to fully distinguish itself from Gilmore.  
Probably as a result of its failure to address the difficulties in proving 
intent of lesser and greater conspiracies, the Sixth Circuit was unable to 
point out the particularly unjust outcomes that could result from a 
misunderstanding of the lesser included offense instruction in 
conspiracy cases.226  Although the court claimed to follow the First 
Circuit’s model for the issue, the Sixth Circuit only truly adhered to one 
concept, that the core facts of the two conspiracies must overlap.227  
Although this point is important, it does not communicate the necessity 
for a liberal approach to allowing lesser included offense instructions in 
conspiracy cases.  A more in-depth recognition of how the application of 
this issue can lead to grossly unjust results on the one hand, and true 
justice on the other, would have more adequately met this goal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Circuit may have arrived at the correct outcome in its 
disposition, but it incorrectly analyzed the nature of the circuit split and 
did not fully address all of the reasons that the Tenth Circuit reached the 
incorrect result.228  While the Sixth Circuit demonstrated an adept 
understanding of the concept that conspiracies can have multiple 
objectives and how that affects lesser included instructions, the court 
failed to correctly characterize the Tenth Circuit’s stance on the issue 
 
 222. Boidi, 568 F.3d at 29. 
 223. Id. at 29–30.  See generally United States v. Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x 654, 657–58 (10th Cir. 
2011). 
 224. See Boidi, 568 F.3d at 29–31.  See generally Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657–58. 
 225. United States v. LaPointe, 690 F.3d 434, 439 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 
U.S. 625, 637 (1980)). 
 226. See generally LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 439–43. 
 227. See id at 441. 
 228. See generally id at 439–43; Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 658. 
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and missed an opportunity to truly differentiate itself from Gilmore.229  
The tenuous nature of the intent element in criminal conspiracy laws 
makes its application to lesser included conspiracy all the more 
important, and the LaPointe opinion did not fully analyze that concept to 
highlight Gilmore’s avoidance of the issue.230  Finally, in briefly 
addressing the overall justice concerns that lie behind the concept of 
lesser included offenses, the Sixth Circuit missed another chance to 
more adequately distance itself from the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in 
Gilmore.231  
When the Sixth Circuit is presented with the lesser included 
conspiracy question again, the court should definitively delineate the 
differences between the second contested fact in dispute prong and the 
third rational jury prong of the lesser included offense analysis.  In 
addition, the court needs to solidify conspiracy laws’ intent requirement 
and reinforce the purpose of avoiding injustice when addressing this 
topic.  This will ensure that future courts more equitably distribute 
justice when dealing with this complicated conspiracy issue. 
  
 
 229. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 441.  See generally Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657–58. 
 230. See generally LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 439–43; Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657–58. 
 231. See LaPointe, 690 F.3d at 439 (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980)).  See 
generally Gilmore, 438 Fed. App’x at 657–58. 
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